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Developing a common law of animal welfare: offences against animals and offences against persons 
compared.  
 
Darren Calley 
 
Abstract  Most animal welfare/suffering cases heard by the courts focus only on the facts: did the defendant, as 
a matter of fact, do those things with which they are charged? Analysis of the 2010 Amersham horse cruelty 
case reveals that there is significant room for ambiguity and subjective interpretation within the statutes that 
underpin animal welfare law. To provide certainty and to allow the law to develop it is essential that cases such 
as Amersham are not only subject to a review of the facts, but also a full analysis of the legal principles 
contained within the relevant statutes.  
 
Introduction 
 
Although much of the preparatory work for this paper was undertaken in the spring of 2010, the subject-matter 
took on increased relevance in November 2010 when the UK‘s coalition government announced that many of 
the previous government‘s statutory protections scheduled to be afforded to animals would be postponed or 
abandoned [15]. For instance, the plans to introduce a ban on the use of non-domesticated animals in travelling 
circuses were postponed for at least one year [4]; a ban on the trimming of battery hens‘ beaks, due to take 
effect in January 2011, was replaced with a commitment by the government to ‗work towards a ban in 2016‘ 
[5]; likewise, a previous commitment to ban the battery cage breeding of game birds was withdrawn.[5]    
 
While these steps might be seen as regressive and disappointing to many animal welfare groups, this article 
will seek to consider if, and to what extent, the courts can provide a means by which the treatment of animals 
can be ameliorated. If the courts can provide an alternative means by which the worst excesses of animal abuse 
can be prohibited, then over time, it may be possible to witness the incremental betterment of the conditions of 
animals, and/or the gradual phasing out of practices that harm animals, without necessarily requiring additional, 
and deeply politically motivated, action at a governmental level. Consequently it will be suggested in this paper 
that animal welfare organisations might wish to supplement ‗traditional‘ means of effecting change – the 
lobbying of Parliament, and consider, to a greater extent, petitioning the courts so as to develop a ‗Common 
Law of Animal Welfare‘.  If lessons can be learned from other strands of the law – the laws of negligence, 
contract, or (perhaps most germane for the present analysis) criminal law, it is that there is not always a need for 
Parliament to intervene and create new laws. This article will show that the law can grow and develop through 
the courts and judicial pronouncements, but there are, however, limits to this development. As will be shown, 
the evolution of the common law is not always a speedy process, and there is little consensus as to the limits of 
judicial activism: the boundary between legitimate interpretation and application of existing law and 
unconstitutional judicial law-making is often a slightly blurred one. Nevertheless, courts are prepared, on 
occasion, to push the boundaries so that laws can, and do, evolve beyond the confines of the original drafter‘s 
intent.   
 
To evolve in this way, however, the common law depends upon judicial scrutiny and interpretation for its 
very life-blood. The appeals process, the hierarchy of the courts and the doctrine of precedent ensure that the 
law is sufficiently fluid and flexible to account for most eventualities, yet sufficiently definite and integrated to 
provide certainty.   
 
The vast majority of animal welfare or animal suffering cases heard by courts are dealt with by a way of a 
review of the facts: did the defendant do that thing with which they are charged: yes or no? Rarely, if ever, will 
courts subject the legislation to a ‗proper‘ legal analysis – that is to say, rather than focussing, almost 
exclusively, on whether the defendant, as a matter of fact, did or did not do the act or omission alleged, the legal 
analysis is to focus on the very nature and extent of the act or omission itself. A simple example might be thus: a 
defendant is charged with failing to take ‗reasonable steps‘ to prevent the infliction, by another person, of 
‗unnecessary suffering‘ upon a dog, contrary to section 4(2)(c) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006.  The fact-
finding tribunal – the so-called ‗lower courts‘, Magistrates and Crown Courts – will largely concentrate on 
whether the defendant actually omitted, as a matter of fact, to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm to the 
dog. Absent of any further guidance or judicial precedent the fact-finding tribunal will simply affix its own 
interpretation of reasonableness to the present set of facts. What they rarely do is to subject the concept of 
‗reasonableness‘ to any extended analysis beyond what is necessary in the immediate case. The lower courts 
will not, and cannot, enunciate guiding principles for future cases, so as to develop the law in a consistent 
fashion and build up a corpus of principle around the concept of ‗reasonableness‘ under section 4(2)(c). This, it 
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will be argued, has the effect of stifling the law‘s development and runs counter to the common law‘s tradition: 
by building up a corpus of principle the law can grow, constantly testing the boundaries of reasonableness, so 
that case-by-case the law incrementally develops and keeps abreast of social, political, scientific and moral 
change. Likewise, any ad hoc decision-making by lower courts, absent of precedent and guiding principles, 
might fail to meter out justice consistently. 
 
Every year thousands of animal welfare/animal suffering cases reach the courts in England and Wales, and 
these are most often (although not exclusively) brought under the Animal Welfare Act of 2006 (‗the AWA‘). 
For example, in 2009 the RSPCA brought 2579 successful prosecutions for animal cruelty offences [12:6]. In 
the previous year a similar number of 2574 prosecutions were brought [12:6], and 2007 resulted in a slightly 
lesser figure of 2026 [11:8].  Similarly Crown Prosecution Service statistics between 2007 and 2009 replicate 
this trend, albeit on a smaller scale, with an annual increase in the number of prosecutions being witnessed: in 
2007 there were 35 prosecutions, increasing to 167 in 2008, to 226 in 2009, and in excess of 238 in 2010.
1
  
 
Thus, there is clearly a great deal of court time be taken up in dealing with these matters and, occasionally 
these cases befit from a ‗proper‘ legal analysis. This article will, therefore, extrapolate from these cases certain 
legal principles that could underpin any incremental development of the law so that certain harms against 
animals – those that are not deemed, at present, to necessarily fall within the AWA‘s reaches – might be 
prosecuted.  
 
A case in point: Gray and Others v RSPCA
2
  
 
Gray and Others v RSPCA was the trial of the horse breeding family at the centre of the so-called ‗Amersham 
case‘ and, it is suggested, is a perfect case in point for two reasons. First, it shows the very real problem of 
‗subjective interpretation‘ that can take place when lower courts (or expert witnesses) affix their own 
interpretation of, ‗reasonableness‘, for example. Secondly it shows that the AWA can, when required to do so, 
negate the need for species or sector specific regulations. To substantiate this latter point, the horses in 
Amersham were ‗farmed‘ animals: that is to say, they were not used in recreation, or sport, or even for 
companionship – they were bred to be slaughtered and to enter the food chain. For the majority of farmed 
animals the relevant regulations are found in the Welfare of Farmed Animals Regulations 1997.
3
 Although 
farmed horses could be covered by the general provisions of the Regulations, unlike hens, calves and pigs, 
horses are not afforded the protection of their own explicit Schedule to the Regulations, which details the 
precise minimum standards to be applied in the farming of these creatures. For horses, therefore, the ‗solution‘ 
requires that the provisions of less specific pieces of legislation (such as the AWA) could be interpreted in such 
a way as to do justice in the individual case.     
 
The facts of ‗Amersham‘ are particularly horrific and were widely reported by the print and television media, 
so only the briefest of summaries should suffice. The Gray family were the proprietors of Spindles Farm near 
Amersham, where from late 2007 to 2008 an RSPCA investigation unearthed an appalling case of animal 
neglect
4
. Over 100 horses were found barely alive on the farm in a filthy, disease-ridden and emaciated state. 
The bodies of dozens more dead horses were found littered around the farm yard.  
 
The proprietor of the farm, James (Jamie) Gray (Snr), and 4 members of his immediate family were charged 
with numerous offences under sections 4 and 9 of the AWA. The factual bases of the charges were that the Gray 
family had variously caused the horses unnecessary suffering by failing to provide adequate nutrition, veterinary 
treatment for obviously sick animals, and housing and environmental needs.  
 
Section 4(1) of the Act makes it an offence to cause, or be likely to cause, an animal (‗a vertebrate other than 
man‘5) unnecessary suffering. Section 4(2) might be best described as the ‗complicity offence‘ whereby those 
persons responsible for an animal (as defined, in a manner of speaking, by s.3) allow unnecessary suffering to be 
caused by another person.   The relevant legal defences – that is to say, the situations in which suffering might 
be deemed to be ‗necessary‘ – are listed in section 4(3). These are: 
  
                                                          
1 Author‘s Freedom of Information Act requests to the Crown Prosecution Service, February 2010 and December 2010 
2 [2010] EW Misc 8 (EWCC) 
3 England, S.I. No (2007) 2078; Wales, S.I. No (2007) 3070 (W.264) 
4 See for further Hughes and Lawson, this issue 
5 Animal Welfare Act 2006, s.1 
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(a) Whether the suffering could reasonably have been avoided or reduced; 
(b) Whether the conduct which caused the suffering was in compliance with any relevant enactment 
or any relevant provisions of a licence or code of practice issued under an enactment; 
(c) Whether the conduct which caused the suffering was for a legitimate purpose, such as— 
  (i) The purpose of benefiting the animal, or 
  (ii) The purpose of protecting a person, property or another animal; 
(d) Whether the suffering was proportionate to the purpose of the conduct concerned; 
(e) Whether the conduct concerned was in all the circumstances that of a reasonably competent and 
humane person. 
 
Although the concept of ‗necessity‘ is given some definition, ‗suffering‘ is not. The Act and its 
accompanying Explanatory Notes do state that suffering entails either physical or mental harms
6
, but for a fuller 
analysis it is helpful, as Radford suggested (in response to similar deficiencies in the AWA‘s predecessor 
statutes) to ‗piece together a body of guidance emanating from the higher courts as to the nature and application 
of the unnecessary suffering test‘ [9:243]. Notwithstanding, for a moment, the fact that most of the cases 
concerning a definition of suffering predate the AWA this endeavour yields some clues as to what suffering is, 
or is not. It is not ‗mere‘ death – the painless killing of an animal will not, according to the Scottish case of 
Patchett v MacDonald
7
, suffice. Lord Cameron in Patchett did, however, suggest that the death of the victim 
dog, caused as it was by a shotgun blast to the head could irrefutably be absent of any suffering: 
 
In my opinion it is not necessarily to be inferred from these facts alone that no pain or suffering would 
be sustained in the interval between infliction of injury and death, any more than that the contrary is to 
be inferred….8 
 
The temporal scope of suffering, whether it need be for an instant or for a more prolonged period, was also 
discussed by Lord Hunter in the same case, who stated that the suffering, howsoever further defined, might be 
for even the briefest of times. In fact the duration of suffering had been discussed over a century prior to 
Patchett, with the court in Murphy v Manning
9
offering the following observation on the suffering caused by the 
cutting off of the combs of fighting cocks: 
 
The fact that it is done quickly does not make any difference. Let anyone try to hold his hand over a 
flame for two seconds, and I think he would say that half a minute, not to say a minute, was a long 
time… 
 
So, having established that there is no minimum duration of ‗suffering‘, what exactly constitutes suffering? 
As Radford notes, suffering remains a concept that is more intuitive rather than measurable [9:243], but as stated 
earlier, the AWA and its Explanatory Notes do anticipate a psychological dimension as well as the infliction of 
physical pain and material discomfort.
10
 The majority of the recently decided cases, however, including the 
Amersham case, centre around the notion of suffering being physical pain, neglect and discomfort.
11
  
 
In addition to the ‗positive act‘ suffering that the Amersham horses were subjected to, the Gray family were 
also charged with failing to meet the welfare needs of the animals.  Section 9(1) is the relevant welfare provision 
of the AWA, whereby a person commits an offence ―if they fail to take such steps as are reasonable in all the 
circumstances to ensure that the needs of the animal for which he his responsible are met‖. Section 9(2) goes on 
to provide a non-exhaustive list of the factors to be taken into account when determining what the needs of an 
animal are. These include: 
 
a) a suitable environment 
b) a suitable diet 
c) the ability to demonstrate normal behaviour patterns 
d) suitable housing – whether with or apart from other animals 
                                                          
6 Animal Welfare Act 2006, s. 62(1); Explanatory Notes, HMSO, 2007, at para.19  
7 (1984) SLT 152 
8 Ibid., at p.154 
9 (1876-77) L.R. 2 Ex. D. 307 
10 Animal Welfare Act, s. 62(1) 
11 Shepherd v Procurator Fiscal (Dornoch) [2010] HCJAC 114; Ward v RSPCA [2010] EWHC 347 (Admin); Burrington v RSPCA [2008] 
EWHC 946 (Admin) 
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e) the animal‘s need to be protected from pain, suffering, injury and disease.  
 
When deciding the question of what is ‗reasonable in all of the circumstances‘, s.9(3) states that ‗any lawful 
purpose for which the animal is kept‘ should be taken into consideration, as should ‗any lawful activity 
undertaken in relation to the animal‘.   
 
It is clear that the judge in Gray¸ Mr Justice Tryer, was not prepared to accept the Grays‘ defence that their 
conduct was ‗reasonable in the circumstances‘ and dismissed all bar two of the Gray‘s numerous appeals: James 
Gray (Snr) was sentenced to 26 weeks in prison, with a life ban on keeping equines imposed; his son James (Jnr) 
was subject to a supervision order for 18 month and banned from keeping equines for 10 years. Julie Gray, 
Cordelia Gray and Jodie Gray – the wife and daughters of James Gray (Snr) were given 150 hours of 
Community Service, as well as 10 year bans. All defendants also received fines and were subject to cost orders 
[14]. Although it was widely reported that James Gray (Snr) received a custodial sentence (once he was 
retrieved after absconding from the court [14]) this aspect of the case is, it is suggested, merely factually 
interesting. More legally important are the findings of Tryer J as to the applicable law, and in particular the 
manner in which the Gray‘s witness in chief was discredited.  
 
John Parker JP, MA, Vet MB, FRCVS should have been an exemplary witness. Not only does his Royal 
College of Veterinary Surgeons biography boast an impressive range of qualifications and skills, he is, he 
boasts, a ‗defence expert witness‘ [10]. Not according to Tryer J, however, who dismissed almost every aspect 
of Parker‘s testimony variously describing it as ‗confused‘, ‗confusing‘, ‗contradictory‘, ‗thoroughly blinkered 
and biased‘ and ultimately ‗embarrassing‘12. These criticisms aside there is an even more important issue to be 
dealt with.  
 
Parker, in his testimony, considered much of Gray‘s treatment of the horses to be perfectly acceptable – 
admittedly not best practice, but in the circumstances it was reasonable. For instance, the feeding regime 
employed on Spindles Farm was claimed to be that of ‗hunger stimulus‘ whereby a limited amount of food 
would be placed in the pens and ‗cleared up‘ by the horses throughout the day. According to Parker this was the 
preferred method of feeding as it eliminated wastage. This was important as food, he noted, costs money and 
there is an economic balance to be struck. Likewise the bedding system operated at Spindles Farm was, for 
Parker, justifiable. The low-labour-intensity and economically balanced ‗manure bed system of bedding‘ – 
whereby straw is simply deposited atop any faeces, would suffice: to remove the faeces more than once a year 
(or possible twice a year, in particularly high density operations) would be an indulgence. Gray, however, and 
many other farmers could not afford such luxuries and thus the system employed at Spindles Farm was 
adequate, or to employ the language of s.9 of the AWA, it was ‗reasonable in all of the circumstances‘ 
according to Parker.     
 
There was no part of the practice adopted on Spindles Farm, said Tryer J, that could be described as 
‗reasonable‘ in any circumstances. The system of cleaning and bedding was ‗deplorable‘ and resulted in most of 
the animals in the farm living their lives perpetually in faeces, and the system of ‗hunger stimulus‘  implemented 
at Spindles Farm was not ‗efficient‘ but  ‗deprivation‘. To justify these manifest failures to implement any form 
of welfare whatsoever, Parker considered the Gray‘s business model: ―they operate at a fairly basic level‖, he 
claimed, and to waste precious time and money on such indulgences when the horses would ultimately be ―sent 
to market rather like potatoes‖ would not be economically viable. This was entirely wrong, according to Tryer J: 
―horses are not potatoes. They are creatures for whom Parliament has determined that they have basic rights.‖ 
Parker, said the Judge, ―was unable to acknowledge that there is a basic level of welfare below which no equine 
can be permitted to fall.‖    
 
The ‘importance’ of Gray 
 
Mr Justice Tryer‘s comments are very much welcomed and it is, of course, heartening to hear members of the 
judiciary talk in such strong terms about animal welfare cases. We must remember, however, that Tryer J is still 
only a relatively lowly District Recorder sitting in a local Crown Court. Much more resonant – and ultimately 
legally significant – would be similar comments from a Lord Justice of Appeal or member of the Supreme Court 
whose opinions have resonance beyond the immediate case and a precedential value that Tryer J‘s opinion does 
not. But why do we need precedent and interpretative guidance? After all are the findings of Judge Tryer so 
obvious and that any right-minded member of the judiciary could not possibly think otherwise?   
                                                          
12 Supra, n.2, at pp.118-120  
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John Parker, Justice of the Peace, probably would. As Chair of the Bench it is entirely possible that if left to 
his own devices his interpretation of the Animal Welfare Act would be radically different to that of Judge Tryer. 
And devoid of precedent to the contrary lower courts are allowed, indeed obliged, to bring to bear their own 
experiences, intuitions and principles to the case. There is every possibility that if Jamie Gray were brought 
before the Bench of Aylesbury Magistrates with Mr Parker as Chair then the man described as the worst animal 
abuser in Britain‘s history [3] may have been acquitted of all charges.  It is, therefore, perhaps slightly 
unfortunate that James Gray has, at the time of writing in December 2010, not chosen to exercise any right of 
appeal, and in so doing allow the superior courts the opportunity to approve or reject Tryer J‘s opinion.     
 
If comfort can be taken from the Gray case it is that Tryer J does show that judges, in these type of case are 
prepared to find an objective interpretation of ‗reasonable in the circumstances‘ and one that does recognises a 
lower-end threshold. Despite the testimony of John Parker that the practices adopted by the Gray family were 
reasonable based on the family‘s ‗basic‘ business model, and the implicit assertion that, because of the 
economics of businesses like the Grays‘, welfare could be compromised (although even Parker agreed that there 
were no excuses for neglect) depending upon the available resources. The message from Gray is, therefore, that 
judges are not prepared to allow ss. 4(3) and 9(3) of the AWA to act as justifications for practices, perhaps 
common within a specific sub-industry, on the basis that ‗everyone in the industry does it‘ so that any given 
practice becomes either ‗necessary‘ (or proportionate) or ‗reasonable in the circumstances.‘  As Tryer J stated 
‗…there is a basic level of welfare below which no equine can be permitted to fall.‘ 
 
The assertion that there is a basic level of welfare below which no equine (or presumably any other animal 
covered by the AWA) can be permitted to fall does, however, beg the question as to whether those practices 
referred to in the introduction of this article might also fall foul of the AWA. It will be recalled that despite the 
postponement/abandonment of certain statutory measures to ban practices such as beak trimming, battery 
farming of game birds, the use of non-domesticated animals in travelling circuses, etc., it was asked whether 
there might be a role for the courts in dealing with these perceived ills. After all, it might appear at first blush 
that the ‗painful mutilation of 20 million chicks per year‘ [2] by beak trimming, is capable of causing suffering, 
and given the justification for this practice – the prevention of feather pecking and cannibalism in the cramped 
conditions of battery cages – one might also ask if it is unnecessary when alternatives, such as truly free range 
eggs, are available [1]. On the question of whether alternatives do in fact exist, the Farm Animal Welfare 
Council (FAWC), upon whose advice DEFRA justified the postponement of the ban, thought not:  
 
until it can be demonstrated reliably under commercial conditions that laying hens can be managed 
without beak trimming and without greater risk to their welfare from feather pecking and cannibalism, 
the ban on beak trimming should not be introduced on its original date in December 2010 [7]    
 
Noteworthy in the FAWC recommendation is the insertion of the phrase ‗under commercial conditions‘. 
FAWC are not saying that no alternatives exist: they are simply exerting that no alternatives exist that are 
commercially viable. In other words although the practice of beak trimming might cause suffering (if not, why 
would DEFRA restate that ‗[t]he Government is committed to banning beak trimming in the long term‘?[4]) it is 
economically necessary – unlike the economically necessary (and unlawful) practices adopted at Spindles Farm.   
 
As to the question of why the AWA might be an inappropriate piece of legislation to deal with such practices, 
a number of suggestions immediately spring to mind. First, one might reasonably point to the absence of a 
specific statutory instrument prohibiting this behaviour – after all if Parliament intended that laying hens were to 
be afforded explicit protections then Parliament would have enacted specific legislation, or the relevant minister 
would have been empowered to introduce specific regulations. There is, of course, some force to this argument: 
the democratic process does, and should allow Parliament to set the standards – but, correlatively, Parliamentary 
silence on any given matter does not mean an absence of law. For example, as noted earlier, the Welfare of 
Farmed Animals Regulations includes specific and explicit minimum welfare requirements for cattle, pigs, 
rabbits and laying hens but are silent on the welfare standards for farmed horses. Does this mean that the court 
in the Amersham case and other ‗farmed horses‘ cases could not apply the provisions of an alternative piece of 
legislation? Clearly not.
13
    
 
The second, perhaps more principled objection to the use of the AWA to prohibit industrial practices such as 
beak trimming is that it was never Parliament‘s intent for the Act to be used in this way. A terse response is 
                                                          
13 R v Ward [2010] EWHC 347 (Admin) 
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simply ‗perhaps not‘. The slightly more lengthy response is that, as the remainder of this article will try to 
demonstrate, even if, at the time of its enactment, it was not envisaged that the AWA would develop its own 
jurisprudence and develop to cover many hitherto unforeseen eventualities, this should not prevent the Act‘s 
provisions from developing. There is nothing in legal principle or legal history to evidence that Acts of 
Parliament cannot take on a life of their own and expand into areas of life that the drafters of the legislation 
could not foresee.  To demonstrate this phenomenon we shall now turn to the Offences Against the Persons Act 
of 1861. 
 
A comparative analysis: the case of offences against the person 
 
As a vehicle for comparison, and to demonstrate how a creatively interpretative approach to the Animal Welfare 
Act can allow this piece of legislation to take on a life of its own, through case law, the Offences Against the 
Persons Act of 1861 (OAPA) is an ideal candidate. For the present analysis this Act is apposite for a number of 
reasons. 
 
The first is that the law concerning offences against the person has grown beyond the narrow confines of the 
bare wording of the Act itself. Secondly, the very subject matter of the OAPA is, and ignoring for the moment 
the differences in species-application of both Acts, closely linked to the AWA, because both Acts concern 
physical harm short of death.  Closely allied to this is the fact that like the AWA, the OAPA operates on a 
number of levels and creates a number of individual offences. As Herring has noted, perhaps the best way of 
describing the Act is it creates a ‗ladder‘ of offences, with the ‗bottom rung‘ offences such as assault being the 
most minor, with major offences such as wounding with intent, or attempted murder being atop the ladder 
[8:313].  Thus, for instance, the main offences situated within the OAPA are listed and considered below. As a 
point of interest it is worth noting that the OPOA itself was, to a large extent, simply a codification of many of 
the existing common law and a product of many centuries of judicial decisions [6:279]. The AWA is, in these 
respects, quite similar: it creates various levels of offence, depending on the ‗type‘ of animal, and is, itself, a 
consolidation of over a century of statute and case law.   
 
Returning to the OAPA, Section 18 deals with wounding with intent, and states that: 
 
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or cause any grievous 
bodily harm to any person, . . . with intent, . . . to do some . . . grievous bodily harm to any person, or 
with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, shall be guilty of 
…[an offence and liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life]14  
 
The related section of the Act, section 20, deals with similar physical circumstances, but whereas a s.18 
offence requires a specific intent (to cause the harm occasioned), the ‗lesser‘ offence under s.20 simply requires:  
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any 
other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall [be guilty of an offence and 
liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years].
15
 
 
It is unlikely that, during the mid 19
th
 century, the drafters of the OAPA, or the first judges into whose 
courtrooms defendants were brought would believe that, 150 years later, the provisions of the Act would, with 
little or no legislative amendment, be used to deal with a plethora of contemporary crimes. In order to 
demonstrate how the OAPA has adapted and shown tremendous versatility – and as an illustrative example of 
how many Acts of Parliament can develop their own jurisprudence beyond their temporal limitations, we shall 
now move to consider such diverse situations as assaults occasioning psychiatric injuries, stalking and 
harassment, and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.   
 
As noted above, sections 18 and 20 deal with ‗wounds‘ (helpfully defined by various cases as ‗a break in the 
continuity of the whole skin‘16) and ‗grievous bodily harm‘ (as an aside, and to show that judicial definitions are 
not always overly helpful, it is noteworthy that the term ‗grievous‘ has been interpreted to mean ‗really serious 
                                                          
14 As amended by Criminal Justice Act 1948 s 1(1); Criminal Law Act 1967 s 12(5)(a) 
15 Ibid.  
16 R v Brown (Anthony) [1994] 1 A.C. 212, at p.231; R v Morris (Paul) [2005] EWCA Crim 609 
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bodily harm‘17). The next rung of the ladder of offences under the OAPA, is that of actual bodily harm, contrary 
to section 47, which states that:   
 
Whosoever shall be convicted upon an indictment of any assault occasioning actual bodily harm shall 
be liable… [to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years] 
 
Again, a number of obvious questions spring to mind when considering section 47: what is an ‗assault‘? 
What is it to ‗occasion‘ the harm in question? And what constitutes ‗actual bodily harm‘? Like the previously 
discussed sections 18 and 20, the answer to these questions is not found within the OAPA itself, but in the 
numerous cases spawned by these statutory provisions.  
 
 So, what is an assault? The answer, in short form, is that an assault can take two forms for the purposes of 
section 47: assault and battery (although as the courts have stated that ―for practical purposes…‗assault‘ is 
generally synonymous with the term ‗battery‘‖18).  The actus reus of the former is defined as ―causing the 
victim to apprehend the immediate application of unlawful force to his body‖19 and the latter being defined as 
―the application of unlawful force.‖20 Courts have, however, demonstrated a degree of creativity in their 
interpretation of what constitutes an ‗assault‘ (in its strict sense) and have found that as well as the ‗swing and 
miss‘ situations – whereby the defendant may attempt to strike the victim but fails – assaults can be carried out 
by words alone, provided, of course, that the necessary immediate apprehension is felt by the recipient of those 
words.
21
 
 
 If threatening words can constitute an assault in the type of situation envisaged in the consolidated appeals of 
R v Ireland; R v Burstow (for instance, ―a man accosting a woman in a dark alley saying ‗come with me or I will 
kill you‘‖22), is it possible for a lack of words to be deemed an assault? Can, for example, the makers of silent 
telephone calls be guilty of an offence of assault? The answer is, yes – provided, of course, that the requisite 
degree of fear has been instilled in the victim.
23
 The Ireland and Burstow appeals do show, it is suggested, the 
House of Lords in a most creative light – by finding that, as a matter of law (and dependant on the facts of each 
individual case) the makers of silent telephone calls may commit the offence of assault (which may, or may not, 
dependent upon the level of harm caused to the victim, be charged under section 47, or the stand-alone charge of 
‗common assault‘). In these cases the Lords managed, at a stroke, to turn an Act of Parliament, enacted 15 years 
prior to the invention of the telephone, into a relevant and contemporary piece of legislation, capable of dealing 
with one of the most pressing social issues of the time.  
 
 One residual question remains, namely, what was the harm envisaged by the OAPA and had the drafters of 
the Act envisaged the very 20
th
 century phenomenon of psychiatric injury constituting an actionable harm? If 
not, how was it possible to sustain a charge, based upon silent telephone calls, under section 47, with its 
requirement that ‗actual bodily harm‘ be occasioned? Clearly, for a ‗common assault‘ the apprehension of 
physical violence would suffice, but for the more serious (in terms of sentencing) charge under section 47 some 
actual injury must be shown. In 1861, however, had the law yet recognised the existence of psychiatric injuries, 
and, more to the point, had it arrived at a settled opinion as to whether such injuries constituted an actual bodily 
harm?   
 
The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is that at the time of the OAPA‘s enactment psychiatric injury was not 
universally accepted as a stand-alone bodily harm. Although the law reports in the latter years of the 19
th
 century 
and the early years of the 20
th
 century do contain accounts of cases, often decided in favour of the claimant, that 
would now be described as psychiatric injury cases, the language used by the judges is clearly not indicative of a 
wholesale recognition of psychiatric harm as a generally applicable head of damage. Instead this tranche of law 
was the almost exclusive domain of ladies of a certain disposition (often pregnant) who were held to have been 
struck down by a ‗malady of the mind‘. Often these cases only resulted in success for the claimant when 
accompanied by additional physical harms.
 24
  For instance, in Victorian Railway Commissioners v Coultas
25
 the 
                                                          
17 DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 
18 Fagan v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [1969] 1QB 439, at p.444 
19 Ibid., at p.444 
20 R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1998] AC 147, at p.161 
21 Ibid., at p.162 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 For one of the few reported exceptions, see Pugh v London Brighton & South Coast Railway Co [1896] 2 QB 248  
25 (1888) 13 App Cas 222 
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claimant suffered a miscarriage – although the claim was denied for ancillary reasons; in Wilkinson v. 
Downton
26
 the claimant suffered ―serious and permanent physical consequences‖; in Dulieu v White27 the 
claimant went into premature labour; in Hambrook v Stokes
28
 the ‗shock‘ was fatal; and in Bourhill v Young29 
the claimant‘s child was stillborn. It should be noted, however, that although the cases referred to above are 
entirely and exclusively civil damages claims, civil damages cases have, nevertheless, had a tangible impact on 
the development of the criminal law.
30
 
 
 Thus, despite the fact that psychiatric injuries were not, in 1861, likely to support a stand-alone criminal 
charge under the OAPA, psychiatric harms are now clearly established as an ‗actual bodily harm‘ for the 
purposes of section 47 of the Act. And in arriving at this conclusion the House of Lords in Ireland, led by Lord 
Steyn, confronted the temporal scope of such Acts, concluding that: 
 
The proposition that the Victorian legislator when enacting sections 18, 20 and 47 of the Act of 1861, 
would not have had in mind psychiatric illness is no doubt correct. Psychiatry was in its infancy in 
1861. But the subjective intention of the draftsman is immaterial. The only relevant inquiry is as to the 
sense of the words in the context in which they are used…the statute must be interpreted in the light of 
the best current scientific appreciation of the link between the body and psychiatric injury.
31
  
 
We have seen, above, that the common law can act as a powerful definitional tool – it can give full meaning 
to words that are left ill-defined by statutes. It can also act as a powerful developmental tool – as the above 
analysis demonstrates the courts can ensure that even centuries old statutes can maintain a high degree of 
relevance. The story does not end there, though: the common law does not merely operate to ‗fill in any gaps‘ 
when the law is otherwise silent on any particular issue. It is also sufficiently flexible to perform the occasional, 
but, significant volte face if and when required.   
 
In recent years the issue of the reckless transmission of HIV/AIDS has been at the forefront of the criminal 
law, with much debate being engendered by the notion of informed consent in these situations.
32
 The basic 
issue, however, of such cases – whether a defendant can be guilty of an offence under the OAPA for the 
transmission of a sexual disease – was first considered by the courts well over a century prior to the HIV/AIDS 
cases in R v Clarence.
33
 
 
Clarence concerned that most fitting of Victorian sexually transmitted diseases, gonorrhoea, and the issue for 
the court was whether the defendant‘s conviction under sections 20 and 47 could be upheld. The defendant, the 
court was told, had infected his wife during sexual intercourse, and it was claimed by the Crown, had the wife 
known of the true state of affairs, she would not have consented to the act. Therefore, the prosecution case 
continued, the wife was the victim of an assault (non-consensual intercourse) which resulted in actual bodily 
harm (the disease). Although there was no singular ratio decidendi, the majority of the court was of the opinion 
that no assault had taken place and quashed the conviction. Perhaps more interesting than the outcome of the 
case is the recognition of the limits to judicial creativity expressed in the opinion of Wills J who observed: 
 
…such considerations lead one to pause on the threshold, and inquire whether the enactment under 
consideration could really have been intended to apply to circumstances so completely removed from 
those which are usually understood when an assault is spoken of, or to deal with matters of any kind 
involving the sexual relation or act.
34
 
 
Although not without sympathy for the wife (the husband‘s acts were, stated Wills J, ―wicked and cruel‖ and 
were, if nothing else, a rape) the fundamental question was whether the OAPA could be construed in such a way 
as to support the defendant‘s conviction: 
 
                                                          
26 [1897] 2 QB 57 
27 [1901] 2KB 669 
28 [1925] 1 KB 141 
29 [1943] AC 92 
30 R v Ireland; R v Burstow, ibid, at pp.156-157, per Lord Steyn 
31 Ibid., at pp.159-160 
32 R v Dica (Mohammed) [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 
33 (1889) L.R. 22 Q.B.D. 23 
34 Ibid., at p.30 
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…such an extension of the criminal law to a vast class of cases with which it has never yet professed to 
deal is a matter for the legislature, and the legislature only. I understand the process of expansion by 
which the doctrines of the common law are properly made by judicial construction to apply to altered 
modes of life and to new circumstances, and results thus legitimately brought about which would have 
startled our ancestors could they have foreseen them. I do not understand such a process, and I do not 
think it legitimate, when every fact and every circumstance which goes to constitute the alleged offence 
is identical with what it has been for many hundreds of years past. Whether further legislation in this 
direction is desirable is a question for legislators rather than lawyers…35 
 
It is noteworthy that prior to Clarence certain lower courts – the tribunals of fact – had, on occasion, found 
sufficient room within the confines of sections 20 and 47 to find a number of defendants guilty of offences 
under these sections in somewhat similar cases. It should be noted, though, that the particularity of these cases 
would render any judgment confined to the particular facts of those cases. So, when no consent to the 
intercourse per se was given (or, as is perhaps unlikely on the facts, where the 12 year old victim did not ‗resist 
sufficiently‘ to the intercourse so as to imply a lack of consent, but consent given in ignorance of the partner‘s 
infection)
36
, or when consent to intercourse was impliedly given by a drugged 13 year old in ignorance of her 
uncle‘s infection,37 then an assault conviction could be sustained. Underpinning Clarence was the now 
discredited principle that ―a husband could not be indicted for rape of his wife.‖38 
 
Despite Wills J‘s questioning, in Clarence, of the necessity for legislative intervention, the legislators did not, 
however, act to fill the lacuna of ‗qualified consensual intercourse‘ (whereby, in the absence of rape – because 
of the consensual nature of the intercourse, but when the victim has not consented, or would not consent, to 
intercourse in full knowledge of the risks of infection). The issue was finally resolved in R v Dica
39
, in which 
the question was largely the same as in the Victorian cases: can the reckless transmission of a disease, through 
otherwise consensual intercourse and absent of rape, constitute an assault occasioning bodily harm, when the 
victim has not consented to the risks of transmission? Yes, it can, said the Court of Appeal:  
  
The effect of this judgment in relation to s.20 is to remove some of the outdated restrictions against the 
successful prosecution of those who, knowing that they are suffering HIV or some other serious sexual 
disease, recklessly transmit it through consensual sexual intercourse, and inflict grievous bodily harm 
on a person from whom the risk is concealed and who is not consenting to it.
40
 
 
Thus, as the above tour de force through some of the principles of the OAPA has shown, courts can and do 
incrementally develop the law, so that ills such as the making of silent telephone calls can be dealt with under an 
Act of Parliament that predates the telephone itself. Likewise, Acts of Parliament can be interpreted to give 
effect to changing social attitudes – as shown above, Victorian Britain had a distinctly different attitude to 
marital relations so that cases such as Clarence were entirely uncontroversial. Society, of course, moved on over 
the subsequent century and, as we have seen in Dica, so did the law.  
 
So, again the question again requires asking. Is it possible that the AWA could develop in such a way? Or 
does there remain a need for the specific statutory provisions, including those so recently abandoned or 
postponed, to afford protection to all animals?     
 
Conclusion 
 
As the eminent legal scholar, A.T.H. Smith wrote in 2004 ―[i]f we can now anticipate that the courts will 
listen…to reasoned argument and respond positively to responsible criticism, the same cannot necessarily be 
said of their political counterparts‖ [13:980]. Within the sphere of animal abuse, it is suggested that Smith‘s 
observation is particularly apt. The purpose of the present paper has been to demonstrate that change, if it is 
needed, to animal welfare laws are not the sole province of Parliament, but can be affected by strategic and 
reasoned litigation. This is not to say that those bodies pushing for further improvements in animal welfare 
standards should abandon Parliamentary lobbying or political pressure – significant developments such as the 
                                                          
35 Ibid., at p.33 
36 R v Sinclair (1867) 13 Cox CC 28 
37 R v Bennett (1866) 4 Foster and Finlason 1105 
38 Per Lord Justice Judge in Dica, supra, at n.33, at para.19; see R v R [1992] 1 AC 599 for the House of Lords‘ overturning of this principle 
39 Supra, at n.33 
40 Ibid., per Lord Justice Judge, at para.59 
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Animal Welfare Act and the Hunting Act have, of course, been the result of such a process. Within these Acts 
there is, nevertheless, always room for improvement and refinement and has been demonstrated throughout this 
paper, improvements and refinements are what the courts can do if given the opportunity.   
 
The problems should not, however, be underestimated. While the purpose of this article was to show that 
Parliamentary intervention is not always required and that, through the courts and judicial pronouncements the 
law can grow and develop, there are limits to this development. First and foremost is the time factor: it is an 
inescapable conclusion that judicial development takes time, and although there is a likely to be a marked 
increase in the rate of development over the life span of the OAPA, incremental development is not necessarily 
a speedy process. Allied to this is the second difficulty, which concerns the limits to judicial activism. 
 
It is difficult to obverse consensus, even amongst judges themselves, of where the limits to judicial activism 
lie and so the task of predicting whether any given case lies beyond the boundaries of legitimate judicial 
activity, or strays into the realms of judicial law-making can often be simply an exercise in wishful thinking or 
idle speculation. For instance in aforementioned Clarence it is clear that the court considered it, as a matter of 
policy, to be beyond their remit to classify as criminal the vast number of cases that had previously not been 
criminalised. Lord Bridge, by way of contrast, suggested in the seminal case of McLoughlin v O’Brian that:  
 
[t]o attempt to draw a line at the furthest point which any of the decided cases happen to have reached, 
and to say that it is for the legislature, not the courts, to extend the limits of liability any further, would 
be, to my mind, an unwarranted abdication of the court's function of developing and adapting 
principles of the common law to changing conditions.
41
  
 
Clearly Lord Bridge is not suggesting that courts should have a free hand in enacting any law it sees fit – he 
is quite simply asserting that the courts should strive to test the boundaries. If compelled to engage in the idle 
speculation of deciding whether a ban on beak trimming, or battery cages for game birds, or the use of exotic 
creatures in circuses might, for instance, fall within or without the limits of legitimate judicial activism, the 
author would suggest the latter: an outright ban, even if supported by sufficient evidence, might be beyond the 
realm of judicial competence. A gradual and incremental development, on the other hand, whereby strategic 
litigation was used, in instances of the worst excesses of ‗legitimate‘ beak trimming, or circuses or shooting 
pens could, at least begin the process of development. Courts can, however, only develop the law when suitable 
cases present themselves, and if those organisations and individuals wish for either (and to subvert a common 
phrase in animal rights/welfare discourse) ‗no cages‘ or ‗bigger cages‘ then, as stated at the outset here, perhaps 
a good place to start might be the courts as well as the lobbies.       
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